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uring the past two decades, most coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa undertook
extensive economic reforms to reverse
declining growth rates and reverse balance-
of-payments deficits. Because of the impor-
tance of the agricultural sector in the region,
agricultural market reforms occupied a cen-
tral place in these liberalization efforts.
These reforms were designed to reduce or
eliminate the bias against agriculture and
open the sector to market forces.The
expectation was that improving price incen-
tives for farmers and reducing government
intervention in the agricultural sector would
be enough to generate a supply response
and allow well-functioning markets to
emerge quickly. Almost two decades later,
the general consensus is that the reform
programs in Sub-Saharan Africa have not
met expectations.
This report reviews the extensive evi-
dence on agricultural market reforms in
Sub-Saharan Africa and summarizes the
impact reforms have had on market perfor-
mance, agricultural production, use of mod-
ern inputs, and poverty. The report offers
eight recommendations for completing the
reform process and developing a new agen-
da for agricultural markets in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
The reform experience in Sub-Saharan
Africa has varied widely across countries
and crop subsectors. The available evi-
dence shows clear progress in some areas
and mixed results in others. Most reforms
were only partially implemented and policy
reversal was common. Once implemented,
however, reforms have increased competi-
tion and reduced marketing margins, bene-
fiting both producers and consumers.
Reforms have also boosted export crop pro-
duction. On the other hand, food crop pro-
duction has stagnated and yields have not
improved. Further expansion of private trade
is constrained by lack of access to credit,
uncertainty about the government’s commit-
ment to reform, and high transaction costs.
Input use, especially on nontraded food
crops such as maize, has declined in some
cases because of the elimination of input
subsidies and devaluation of the local cur-
rency. Reforms have had mixed impacts on
poverty, increasing the income of small
export growers but hurting farmers living in
remote areas. Contrary to conventional wis-
dom, however, the evidence indicates that
since the 1980s rural poverty has declined
in many African countries.
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and William Masters from Purdue University
in the United States.The authors would like
to thank Klaus von Grebmer and partici-
pants at the IFPRI policy seminar held on
April 13, 2000, for their useful comments.
The authors are also indebted to Raisuddin
Ahmed for his guidance and support during
the writing of this manuscript. Uday Mohan
is duly acknowledged for his editorial contri-
bution to this manuscript.7
INTRODUCTION
THE NEED FOR AGRICULTURAL REFORM
D
uring the past two decades, most coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa undertook
extensive economic reforms to reduce the
role of the government and increase the role
of the market in their economies. Because of
the importance of the agricultural sector in
the region, agricultural market reforms occu-
pied a central place in these liberalization
efforts.1 Agricultural reforms included the
removal of price controls, deregulation of
agricultural marketing, closure of state-
owned enterprises that monopolized agricul-
tural trade, and changes in the foreign
exchange market to provide greater incen-
tives for exports.The expectation was that
improving price incentives for farmers and
reducing government intervention in the agri-
cultural sector would be enough to generate
a supply response and allow well-functioning
markets to emerge quickly.
Almost two decades later, the general
consensus is that the reform programs in
Sub-Saharan Africa have not met expecta-
tions. Average annual growth rates of per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) and
agricultural value-added have been negative
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Economic
performance has trailed that of other devel-
oping regions (Figure 1). At the beginning of
the 21st century, Sub-Saharan Africa con-
fronts a number of daunting problems: exten-
sive hunger, malnutrition, poverty, resource
degradation, and the spread of AIDS.
Because the majority of the region’s popula-
tion remains dependent on agriculture for its
livelihood, well-functioning and efficient agri-
cultural markets continue to be key to improv-
ing Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic health.
This report reviews the extensive evi-
dence on agricultural market reforms in Sub-
Saharan Africa and summarizes the impact
reforms have had on market performance,
agricultural production, use of modern inputs,
and poverty.The report offers eight recom-
mendations for completing the reform process
and developing a new agenda for agricultural
markets in Sub-Saharan Africa.
W
hy were agricultural market reforms
needed? Answering this question calls
for a look at the agricultural policies of the 1960s
and 1970s and the problems that resulted.
Agricultural Policies before Reforms
From independence through the 1970s,
African governments played a relatively
large role in national economies, and the
agricultural sector was no exception.
Policymakers held the common view that
private traders were exploitative and that
markets could not be trusted with the critical
task of feeding the nation. Furthermore, they
equated economic development with indus-
trialization, relegating agriculture to the role













Figure 1—Net per capita agricultural
production, 1961–97
Source: FAOSTAT 1998 (statistical database of the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.)8
food to industry. Small-scale agriculture was
seen as inherently inefficient because unedu-
cated farmers were unable or unwilling to
apply modern techniques such as mecha-
nization.
Because of these views, state enterprises
(often inherited from colonial powers) were
given the responsibility of organizing food
markets and fixing nationwide prices for
farmers and consumers.Their success in
doing so varied (Box 1). State enterprises
also managed export crop production by
farmers by providing inputs on credit, fixing
crop prices, and monopolizing the process-
ing and export of the crop.The prices farm-
ers received were generally low because of
taxation or high costs incurred by state
enterprises, or both. In many countries,
export crop prices averaged less than half
the world market rate.2 State enterprises
also monopolized the import and distribution
of fertilizer and other inputs, which were
often supplied to farmers at subsidized
prices and on credit.
Pressure for Reform
Pressure for economic reforms came from
several sources. In the 1970s, commodity
prices boomed, allowing governments to
expand their operations and greatly
increase the size of the civil service.When
commodity prices declined in the late
1970s, governments found it difficult to cut
expenditures, resulting in large fiscal
deficits. Significant losses incurred by state-
owned enterprises exacerbated these
deficits. Governments generally used mone-
tary expansion to cover the deficits, thus
causing inflation. Because exchange rates
were fixed, inflation made export commodi-
ties less competitive on the international
market, simultaneously increasing incen-
tives to import goods that could be pro-
duced locally. Import tariffs and other
barriers, already kept high to protect domes-
tic industry, were increased further to stem
the growing flow of imports.
These policies often had adverse effects
on farmers and on the agricultural sector
generally. Explicit taxation, the high market-
ing costs of state enterprises, and the over-
valuation of the currency hurt export crop
production in particular. In countries with
repressive food marketing policies, farmers
switched into unregulated crops such as
roots and tubers.The emergence of parallel
or black markets and cross-border smuggling
provided additional evidence of the failure of
interventionist policies. Although inputs were
subsidized, budget constraints and bureau-
cratic problems often led to shortages and
delays in delivery of these goods.
Box 1
Postindependence State
Intervention in Food Markets
T
he nature and extent of postinde-
pendence state intervention varied
widely among Sub-Saharan African
countries, depending in part on their
colonial legacies. In general, state inter-
vention in the food sector before market
reform can be distinguished by its sup-
port for, discrimination against, or rela-
tive neutrality toward agricultural
production. In countries committed to
supporting agriculture, such as Kenya,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the use of sub-
sidies for inputs, credit, and transport
costs promoted smallholder incomes,
albeit at a substantial fiscal cost.
Countries in which prereform policies
discriminated against agriculture, such
as Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, and
Mozambique, harmed smallholder
incomes by banning private trade and
engaging in direct food distribution
through rationing. But countries with few
colonial settlements and no single domi-
nant crop, such as Ghana and
Cameroon, hardly intervened in food
markets.9
Inflation, stagnant economic growth, and
shortages of consumer goods created
doubts about the existing economic strate-
gy. For many countries, however, significant
reforms were postponed until trade deficits
began depleting foreign reserves and could
no longer be covered by foreign borrowing.
At this point, political leaders were forced to
seek funding from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), accept-
ing the policy conditions that were attached.
Although the process was not uniform
across the region, almost all countries
adopted a series of economic reforms,
including agricultural market liberalization,
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
The Nature of the Reforms
The agricultural reforms introduced by the
World Bank and IMF were designed to
reduce or eliminate the bias against agricul-
ture and open the sector to market forces.3
The reforms were based on two beliefs: that
reducing or eliminating state control over
marketing would promote private-sector
activity and that fostering competitive mar-
kets would lead to increased agricultural
production.To these ends the reforms
included four types of measures:
• liberalizing input and output prices by
eliminating subsidies on agricultural inputs
such as fertilizer and credit, by bringing
domestic crop prices in line with world
prices, and by ending the practice of
imposing a single price for all regions and
seasons
• reducing overvalued exchange rates by
partially liberalizing the market for foreign
exchange
• encouraging private-sector activity by
removing regulatory controls in input and
output markets, lifting restrictions on the
internal movement of food crops, and
relaxing delivery quotas, licensing
arrangements, and similar regulations
• restructuring public enterprises and
restricting marketing boards to activities
such as providing market information and
maintaining security stocks
HOW FAR DID REFORMS GO?
Some Reforms Were Partial 
T
he pace and extent of reforms have var-
ied widely across countries and crop
subsectors (Tables 1 and 2). For the most
part, reforms were not fully implemented.
For example, many governments liberalized
internal trade but maintained a state monop-
oly over external trade (Box 2). In other
instances, although fixed prices were elimi-
nated, price bands for food crops were
imposed to limit market price fluctuations
and protect consumers and producers from
the allegedly “exploitative” behavior of pri-
vate traders. State-owned enterprises
remain active in several commodity subsec-
tors, notably cotton in West Africa and
maize in Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe.
Policy Reversal Was Common
Many countries reversed reforms as a result
of external shocks or changing economic
conditions. Malawi, for instance, reinstated
fertilizer subsidies that were to be phased
out in the mid-1980s because currency
devaluation and the severance of transport
routes through Mozambique significantly
raised fertilizer prices. Zambia reversed
maize market liberalization under pressure
from urban consumers who faced higher
prices. In general, countries did not follow a
linear path toward liberalization, and reforms
often were not seriously implemented until
the early to mid-1990s (Box 3).10
Table 1—Extent of food marketing reform in selected countries
Output market Wheat imports Rice imports
Country Crop Before After Before After Before After
Benin Tubers  ❍ ✪ ✪ ✪✪
Ethiopia Teff, maize, wheat  ❍ ✽ ✪ ✽✪
Ghana Tubers ❍❍ ✽ ✽ ✪✪
Kenya Maize    ✽ ✽ ✽✪
Madagascar Rice  ❍ ✽ ✽ — ✪
Malawi Maize  ◗ ✪✪ ✪✪
Mali Millet, sorghum  ❍ ✽ ✪ ✽✪
Tanzania Maize  ❍ ✽ ✪ ✽✪
Zambia Maize  ◗ —— — —
Zimbabwe Maize    ✽ ✽ ✽✪
Sources: World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead (Washington, D.C., 1994), cited in P. Seppala,
Food Marketing Reconsidered: An Assessment of the Liberalization of Food Marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa, Research for Action
No. 34 (Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1997); and for Ethiopia see A.
Lirenso, “A Grain Marketing Reform in Ethiopia,” Ph.D. thesis (School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, U.K., 1993).
Notes:     Major restrictions on purchases and sales. ◗  Limited intervention by state buying agency.
❍ No intervention except food security stocks.    ✽ State monopoly.      ✪ No monopoly.
—  Data not available.
Table 2—Extent of market reform in the export crop sector
Country                        Commodity Marketing channel after reforms
Benin Cotton Full parastatal control of prices, marketing, and inputs.
Cameroon Cocoa, coffee Liberalized marketing and export starting in 1994 for both crops.
Côte d’Ivoire Cocoa Caisse de stabilization system until 1998/99; liberalized thereafter.
Ghana Cocoa Full parastatal control of prices and marketing.
Malawi Tobacco All marketing through private auctions with low competition. 
Mali Cotton Full parastatal control of prices, marketing, and inputs.
Nigeria Cocoa Complete liberalization in a short period.
Senegal Groundnuts Most groundnuts exported as oil. Marketing and processing only
partially liberalized.
Tanzania Coffee, cotton, cashew Coffee largely liberalized starting in 1990/1991. Cotton partially
liberalized at first, now fully, as is cashew. State-run cooperative
unions continue to compete with the private sector but only handle
a small share of crop output.
Uganda Coffee Full liberalization, with parastatal primarily playing a regulatory
function.
Sources:  R. F. Townsend, Agricultural Incentives in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Challenges, Technical Paper No. 444 (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 1999). Information on cashews for Tanzania comes from C. L. Delgado and N. W. Minot, Agriculture in Tanzania
since 1986: Follower or Leader of Growth? World Bank Country Study (Dar es Salaam and Washington, D.C.: Government of the
United Republic of Tanzania, World Bank, and IFPRI, 2000).11
Government Commitment Was Weak
A slow and incomplete reform process
resulted from several factors, including weak
commitment on the part of African policy-
makers to reforms imposed by donors, fear
of disturbing existing patron-client relation-
ships, and concern over losing important
sources of public revenue. Reforms
designed to eliminate the rents and privi-
leges enjoyed by public enterprise employ-
ees met with strong resistance. And
because governments negotiated and
implemented the structural adjustment pro-
grams, they often continued the old ways of
doing business.4 For the most part govern-
ments did not encourage the participation of
important constituents such as private busi-
nesses and nongovernmental organizations,
choosing instead a top-down approach. At
the same time, governments themselves
rarely felt the sense of ownership necessary
to sustain the reform effort.5 The resulting
climate of uncertainty and mistrust affected
private investment, because private busi-
nesses were generally reluctant to invest 
in countries where governments lacked
credibility.
Box 2
Partial Reform in Senegal’s Groundnut Market
I
ntervention in Senegal’s groundnut market was designed to protect the country’s paras-
tatal processing mill, which contributes a large share to Senegal’s export earnings.
Because this revenue is so important, the government has fought to maintain some control
over the unshelled groundnut subsector.The country still has official pricing schemes and
regulatory controls over the unshelled groundnut market, so the subsector faces many of
the same problems it faced before the reforms were initiated. Private-trader involvement
remains limited because of the uncertainty of the policy environment. Moreover, the exis-
tence of parallel marketing channels, one official and the other unofficial, means that prices
vary widely over time.The result is an underdeveloped and inefficient marketing system for
groundnuts, with high processing costs that may ultimately prevent Senegal from compet-
ing in international markets.6
Box 3
Policy Reversal in Fertilizer Subsidies 
S
ome countries abandoned early attempts to remove fertilizer subsidies, only to restart
and complete them later. Ghana, Malawi, and Nigeria all had announced programs to
phase out fertilizer subsidies in the mid-1980s. In Ghana, the subsidy was eliminated in
1984–85, but in order to sell government stocks the nominal price was fixed for 1986, thus
reintroducing the subsidy.  It was phased out again in the late 1980s. In Malawi, the gov-
ernment launched a program to phase out subsidies during 1985–88, but abandoned the
effort in the second year because of poor rains, disruption of the transport routes through
Mozambique, and a large currency devaluation. Fertilizer subsidies were removed in
1995–96. Nigeria reduced fertilizer subsidies from about 80 percent to 26 percent in 1986,
but by failing to adjust the nominal price following a large devaluation, it effectively reestab-
lished the subsidy. The government removed the subsidy in the mid-1990s, but a new gov-
ernment has announced its intention to reintroduce the subsidy.712
Reforms Were Most Comprehensive in
the Food Sector 
In general market reforms were more com-
prehensive in food markets than in export
crop or input markets.The main reason for
this difference was that the purchase and
sale of export commodities brought consid-
erable revenue to many governments, while
food-crop marketing typically brought loss-
es.8 In much of Africa, government interven-
tion is still pronounced in the input sector,
which traditionally has been more heavily
controlled than cereal trading and distribu-
tion. Although multinationals and private
traders have penetrated the fertilizer and
seed markets in many countries, state-
owned enterprises still dominate those mar-
kets in Benin, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi,
Senegal, and elsewhere. In Mali, for exam-
ple, two state enterprises account for 95
percent of fertilizer distribution.9 In Benin,
the cotton parastatal distributes 85 percent
of the fertilizer. Although it contracts private
companies to import and deliver fertilizer, it
fixes prices based on the average bid.10
IMPACT OF THE REFORMS
H
ow successful has agricultural market
reform been in Sub-Saharan Africa?
How has it affected market performance,
agricultural production, input use, farm pro-
ductivity, and poverty? The available evi-
dence shows clear progress in some areas
and mixed results in others.
Market Performance
Assessments of market performance since
the reforms have focused on the expansion
of private trading, reductions in marketing
margins, and increases in market efficiency
(measured by the degree of market integra-
tion). In general all three areas have seen
improvements since the 1980s. However,
further expansion of private trade faces
many constraints and marketing boards are
still active in some countries.
Private trade has expanded. Market liber-
alization has encouraged private trade, even
in cases where parastatals are still active.
Small private traders have emerged in
response to increased market opportunities.11
In certain export markets, the presence of
multinationals has fostered a well-coordinated
domestic private-trading sector. In Tanzania,
multinationals contract with private, domes-
tic traders to buy tobacco and cashew nuts
from small farmers, and these traders have
little difficulty accessing credit or finding buy-
ers. In Malawi, small farmers sell their tobac-
co on auction floors to international buyers,
something only large estate farms could do
before the reforms.
Further expansion is constrained. Private
dealers are constrained by lack of credit and
uncertainty about the government’s commit-
ment to reform.The lack of access to credit
and working capital is a significant barrier to
further expansion of private trade, prevent-
ing traders from moving into areas such as
wholesale commerce, transport, and stor-
age.12 Uncertainty about the role of the
state has led to a vicious cycle of mistrust
and speculative behavior that hampers the
reform process in East and Southern Africa.
Other constraints to private-sector expan-
sion include lack of adequate market infor-
mation, poor roads and communications
infrastructure, limited access to storage and
transport facilities, and unclear property
rights (Box 4).13
Box 4
Input Market Liberalization and
Private Trade in Madagascar 
M
adagascar has experienced pos-
itive gains from liberalization in
terms of private trader participation.
The level of competition is relatively
high and barriers to entry are low.14
Enterprising traders are not held back
by policy constraints in either the input
or output market.
Yet other serious constraints exist,
especially poor infrastructure and a
lack of access to credit.The trans-
portation infrastructure is so under-
developed that transportation costs for
individual traders account for about 52
percent of total business costs. High
interest rates (up to 20 percent) often
prevent traders from borrowing. In
addition the volume of trade in inputs
has remained small, in part because
small farmers often cannot afford mod-
ern inputs. Import prices for inputs
such as fertilizer are high, and a short-
age of information (including extension
services) further limits demand.
Senegal, parastatals continue to handle the
majority of marketing and distribution for
export crops.
Marketing margins have narrowed.
Marketing margins—defined as the spread
between producer and consumer prices—
have fallen from prereform levels, reflecting
the lower marketing and processing costs of
a more competitive private sector. In turn,
this has improved transmission of world
prices to farmers and forced real consumer
prices downward.15
Two main factors have helped reduce
marketing margins in maize markets. First, in
East and Southern Africa, private-sector par-
ticipation in grain marketing and milling and
the liberalization of interregional trade have
narrowed the margins between producer and
consumer prices for maize meal and
increased consumer access to maize mar-
kets.When the government stopped subsi-
dizing large maize mills, many households
began buying from smaller mills where maize
meal was cheaper, raising market share for
these small enterprises.16 Second, price
spreads between surplus and deficit regions
have declined (Figure 2). Cereal market liber-
alization in Mali, for instance, has reduced
transaction costs for private traders (who no
longer need to operate on the black market)
and increased the flow of cereals from sur-
plus to deficit areas.
Marketing margins have decreased simi-
larly in the export crop sector, in countries
where export market liberalization has
occurred.The producer’s share of the f.o.b.
(free on board) price is the best measure of
how well the reforms have succeeded in
passing on the benefits of liberalization to
producers.The producer’s share of the f.o.b.
price has ranged from 64 to 98 percent in
Cameroon, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda,
where markets have been widely liberalized.
But in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and
Senegal, where reform has been slow or
nonexistent, the producer’s share has
remained low—between 37 and 62 percent.
Marketing boards are still active. Marketing
boards also continue to constrain private
trade. Grain marketing boards in most
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa were
restructured and given responsibility for a
few functions—developing a market infor-
mation system, stabilizing prices, and
ensuring food security, in part by maintain-
ing stocks.13 But many marketing boards
lack the money to support prices and in
some countries are still active in the grain
trade, competing with private dealers.The
combination of the private sector’s uncer-
tainty about future policy and state involve-
ment in grain trading makes for volatile grain
markets. In Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and14
Markets have become increasingly inte-
grated. In general, market integration is
measured by how well price signals are
transmitted among markets. Integrated mar-
kets allow for the efficient flow of commodi-
ties from surplus to deficit regions.While the
level of market integration in Africa remains
lower than in other developing countries, it
has improved since the reforms were insti-
tuted.17 In part this improvement has
depended on the prereform situation. For
example, countries such as Benin and
Ghana, where the private sector controlled
food marketing before liberalization, have
developed better-integrated grain markets
than countries such as Malawi and
Madagascar, where parastatals dominated
food marketing.18 Most of the improvement
is the result of increased private-sector par-
ticipation in trading activities—participation
that has fostered the efficient transmission
of information and prices among markets.
Agricultural Production
The basic premise of agricultural market
reform is that improving the incentive struc-
ture for small farmers (in the form of higher
prices and well-functioning markets) will gen-
erate a positive supply response, increasing
both agricultural output and income levels.
But the average growth of agricultural pro-
duction per capita has been negative in Sub-
Saharan Africa since the 1970s (Figure 1).
For small farmers in some countries, reform
has meant the elimination of government
input and credit subsidies—a loss that has
kept yields stagnant or reduced them.Where
production growth has occurred, it is the
result of increases in the amount of land
under cultivation rather than of yield increases.
And where producers have benefited, the
bulk of the gains have gone to export and
cash-crop farmers with access to credit and
modern inputs (such as fertilizer).
Food production has stagnated. Although
positive changes have occurred in some sec-
tors and countries, overall food production
per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa has stag-
nated. West African countries have per-
formed better in terms of food production
than countries in East and Southern Africa,
for several reasons (Figure 3). First, the food
markets in West Africa have traditionally
been more open than those in other parts of
the continent. Second, the 1994 devaluation
in West Africa increased the relative price of
imported foodstuffs, boosting the demand for
local food crops. Finally there is some evi-
dence that because of higher prices received
by cash-crop producers, fertilizer use on cash
crops has increased in some West African
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali).
Increased access to fertilizer and cash
income from export crop production has also
allowed farmers in parts of West Africa to use
more fertilizer on food crops. In contrast, food
crop production in several East and Southern
African countries has declined because the
elimination of food subsidies has resulted in



















Figure 2—Difference in marketing margins
between central markets in
selected countries
Sources: O. Badiane F. Goletti, M. Kherallah, P. Berry, K.
Govindan, P. Gruhn, and M. Mendoza. “Agricultural Input
and Output Marketing Reforms in African Countries,” final
donor report (IFPRI, Washington, D.C. 1997); A. Negassa
and T. S. Jayne, The Response of Ethiopian Grain Markets
to Liberalization, Working Paper 6 (Addis Ababa: Grain
Market Research Project, Ministry of Economic Development
and Cooperation, 1997).
Notes:  With the exception of Ethiopia, margins are the relative
margin, defined as the price spread divided by the producer
price. For Benin, the price spread for maize is between
Parakou and Cotonou for the periods 1985–89 and 1990–95.
For Malawi, price spread for maize is between Nkhotakota
and Lilongwe for the period 1984–87 and 1988–91. For
Ethiopia, the price spread for teff is the absolute margin
between Addis Ababa and Bako for the period 1986–1996.15
The food supply response in Sub-Saharan
Africa has been limited by structural and
institutional constraints that have persisted
despite market reforms. Nonprice factors can
have a more profound impact than prices on
aggregate agricultural output.19 These fac-
tors include the condition of infrastructure
(such as roads, irrigation schemes, and com-
munication networks); the availability of mar-
keting services, modern inputs, and credit
(especially in rural areas); and government
support in the form of research and extension
services, human capital development, and
commitment to reform. Physical factors such
as the weather and soil quality also affect
output.
Export crop production has increased.
Export crops have responded more strongly
to liberalization than foodgrains. Most price
changes have favored tradables, making
export crops more attractive than domestic
staples. Export crops were also taxed more
heavily before the reforms, making their
postreform response particularly vigorous.
In addition, price control was far less effec-
tive for food than for export crops, so that
farmers growing food crops were less affect-
ed by official prices (and more responsive to
unofficial prices) than farmers growing
export crops. Cash-crop sectors such as
cotton in Benin and Mali, cashew nuts in
Mozambique and Tanzania, and coffee in
Uganda have been among the most respon-
sive to reforms, largely because of higher
producer prices, exchange rate liberaliza-
tion, privatization, infrastructure investment,
and improved input supply.
Input Use 
The use of modern inputs declined in some
countries—more so for food than for cash
crops, and in part because of the elimina-
tion of input subsidies. The lack of well-
functioning agricultural credit markets to
finance purchases of inputs has exacerbat-
ed the problem. In general, the use of fertil-
izer, arguably the most important purchased
input in African agriculture, is still very low,
especially compared with other developing
countries (Table 3).
Fertilizer prices have risen. A number of
reforms have affected fertilizer prices,
including the elimination of fertilizer subsi-
dies, the depreciation of the real exchange
rate, and liberalization of fertilizer imports
and distribution.The fertilizer-crop price
ratio has more than doubled in four out of
ten countries examined (Benin, Ghana,
Nigeria, and Tanzania) and increased at
least 50 percent in three more (Malawi,
Senegal, and Zambia). On the other hand,
the fertilizer-crop price ratio fell in Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Zimbabwe.
Fertilizer use declined before rebounding
slightly. Fertilizer use rose steadily from
1970 until 1992 (Figure 4).The positive trend
stopped in 1992 as fertilizer use dropped
more than 20 percent in 1994 and 1995
before partially rebounding in 1996.The drop
in Nigerian fertilizer use, which accounts for
more than one-third of fertilizer use in Sub-
Saharan Africa, explains the decline in fertil-
izer consumption in 1994 and 1995. Fertilizer
application rates, expressed as kilograms of
nutrients per hectare of arable land, generally













Figure 3—Net per capita food production,
1961–97
Note: Each graph line represents the index for that region
divided by the index for all regions.
Source: FAOSTAT 1998 (statistical database of the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).16
Declining demand for fertilizer since lib-
eralization has led to speculation that fertil-
izer market reform has had adverse effects
on agricultural productivity and rural
incomes. Indeed, some of the effects of fer-
tilizer reform have been less positive than
expected. Cost savings from privatization
have not been enough to prevent prices
from rising as subsidies were removed.
Despite the increased availability of fertilizer
through new, more efficient delivery net-
works, demand remains weak. Increased
fertilizer-crop price ratios mean that many
farmers have been reluctant to increase
their use of fertilizer, and in some countries
farmers use less fertilizer than they did
before the reforms.
On the other hand, fertilizer market
reform has fulfilled expectations in some
respects. Comparing the early 1980s and
the mid-1990s, fertilizer use has fallen in 7
of the main fertilizer-using countries, but
increased in 14. Countries devoting a higher
share of fertilizer to cash crops have seen
fertilizer use grow relatively rapidly through
the reform period.This includes most of the
cotton-producing countries of West Africa. In
contrast, countries using fertilizer mainly on
maize, such as Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania,
and Zambia have seen slower growth and
some declines in absolute fertilizer use.
Effects on production and income are
negligible. It is difficult to find evidence of
any adverse impact of fertilizer market liber-
alization on agricultural production in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Agricultural production
appears to be more sensitive to weather,
agricultural policy, and shifts in exchange
rates than to fertilizer policy.The removal of
subsidies and subsequent increases in the
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Figure 4—Trends in fertilizer use and
application rates, 1970–96
Source: FAOSTAT 1998 (statistical database of the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).
Table 3—Global fertilizer application rates, by region
Annual growth 
rate from 1980–81 
Region 1980–81 1990–91 1996–97 to 1996–97
(kg of nutrients/ha of arable land) (percent)  
World 88 100 98 0.7  
Developed countries 120 112 86 – 2.1  
Economies in transition 104 104 33 – 6.9  
Developing countries 57 89 107 4.0  
Latin America and the Caribbean 64 63 71 0.7  
Near East and North Africa 45 67 65 2.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 8 10 9 0.7  
East Asia and Southeast Asia 121 179 238 4.3  
South Asia 37 80 93 5.9  
Source: FAOSTAT 1998 (statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).
Note: kg stands for kilogram, ha for hectare.17
fertilizer-crop price ratios have had negligi-
ble impacts on welfare.The changes affect-
ed approximately 15–35 percent of rural
households (that is, those that used fertiliz-
er) and had a greater impact on relatively
larger farms located in high-potential areas
because these farms benefited the most
from fertilizer subsidies. Several estimates
suggest that fertilizer subsidy removal
reduced rural income by 1–2 percent at
most. On the other hand, the positive effects
of better availability, timing, and product
choice have not been evaluated.
Access to credit for input use has
decreased. Access to credit for input use
has declined in cases where state-sponsored
credit systems have collapsed.The decline
in input use in Sub-Saharan Africa is most
serious in countries where input and credit
subsidies were eliminated at the same time,
and where fertilizer is mostly applied to
maize (such as in Malawi). In Tanzania,
where inputs on credit are not available and
export markets are no longer dominated by
state-owned enterprises, input use on cot-
ton has also declined. In contrast, in coun-
tries such as Benin and Burkina Faso,
where cotton inputs are available on credit
through the government, input use has
increased and has had positive spillover
effects on food production.
The integrated cash-crop marketing and
input distribution system provided by state-
owned enterprises allowed inputs to be pur-
chased on credit. But the private sector has
not been able to provide inputs on credit to
farmers because of its inability to enforce
loan repayment. Under parastatal marketing
arrangements, farmers often received seed,
pesticides, and fertilizers from the parastatal.
The cost of those inputs was later deducted
from what the parastatal paid for the crop.
With multiple outlets now available, the
farmer is not obliged to sell the crop to the
entity that advanced funds for inputs.This
situation has prevented the private sector
from offering inputs on credit.
Total factor productivity has increased.
Changes in total factor productivity, defined
as the amount of total output generated by
all factors used in production, provide the
most accurate measure of national and
regional productivity trends. Total factor pro-
ductivity stagnated throughout the mid-
1960s and 1970s but appears to have
increased in the 1980s and 1990s.The
lagged effect of research expenditures and
policy reform account for as much as two-
thirds of the growth in total factor productivity
during the 1980s.20 This raises questions
about whether the recovery in the 1980s is
sustainable in the long run given the reduc-
tion in research expenditures throughout the
reform period. Countries such as Kenya and
Zimbabwe, for example, have not experi-
enced significant increases in food produc-
tivity since liberalization. In these countries
the elimination of public support for small
farmers cost these producers access to
affordable modern inputs. Land productivity
stagnated or declined as a result.21
Poverty  
Agricultural production constitutes the most
important source of income and employ-
ment for the majority of households in Sub-
Saharan Africa. By stimulating agricultural
production, market reforms were expected
to improve rural incomes and alleviate
poverty. In many Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, rural poverty rates have declined since
the 1980s. Although not all of the decline
can be attributed to agricultural reforms, this
trend challenges the view that the rural poor
have been adversely affected by agricultural
market liberalization.
Changes in producer food prices have
had mixed effects. The impact of market
reforms on income through changes in food
prices has varied across countries and
crops, in large part owing to differences in
prior conditions and levels of intervention.
Many smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan18
Africa are net foodgrain buyers.Therefore,
in the short run, higher farm prices could be
detrimental to these households unless
market reform can reduce the margin
between producer and consumer prices. For
example, one-third of rice farmers that fell
below the poverty line were hurt by higher
and more variable rice prices following agri-
cultural market liberalization in Madagascar.22
However, in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire,
where both agricultural production and
household food consumption are diversified,
increases in producer prices had no signifi-
cant impact on the rural poor.23 
A larger marketable surplus is usually
associated with larger and wealthier farms,
and therefore higher farm prices tend to
favor the better-off farmers more than the
poor ones.24 In East and Southern Africa,
however, reforms have resulted in lower
farm prices, thereby hurting commercial
farmers. Some households may produce
mainly for subsistence—especially in
remote areas—and therefore will have little
or no contact with agricultural markets and
will be insulated from changes in product
prices.25
Market reforms have reduced consumer
food prices. Although market reforms could
lead to higher farm prices they could simul-
taneously reduce consumer prices by
decreasing marketing costs. Increased com-
petition and greater efficiency brought about
by liberalization have reduced marketing
margins in many African countries, thereby
benefiting both food producers and con-
sumers.26 In Ghana food prices have
decreased since the reforms, in part
because investments in roads and better
trucks have reduced marketing costs.27 In
East and Southern Africa maize meal pro-
duction has shifted to cheaper mills, offset-
ting the price increases that came with the
elimination of consumer price subsidies.28
Overall, consumer prices for major food
crops have fallen in a number of countries,
including Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali,
Tanzania, and Zambia.
Reforms reduced market inefficiencies,
offsetting some of the negative effects of
price rises. Even if food crop prices did
rise, their negative impact on net food buy-
ers and poor consumers was mitigated by a
reduction in market inefficiency following lib-
eralization. Before reforms, many govern-
ments were ineffective in providing cheap
food to the most needy and created many
marketing inefficiencies.29 As a result,
many poor consumers had to rely on paral-
lel markets to meet their food requirements
because government-subsidized grain was
often rationed or poorly targeted.
Higher export crop prices have benefited
export crop farmers. Devaluation and
export market liberalization increased the
income of small export growers by about 20
percent on average between 1990 and
1997, although this varied greatly across
countries and crops.The income of poor
and nonpoor rural households has
increased in several countries, including
Benin, Cameroon, Gambia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Niger, and Uganda. Small-scale cot-
ton growers in Benin and producers of
cashew nuts and tobacco in Tanzania have
benefited from higher producer prices
thanks to declining marketing margins and
the depreciation of the real exchange rate.
Similarly, following the liberalization of bur-
ley tobacco production and marketing in
Malawi, increased tobacco production
increased the cash income of smallholder
farmers in that country (Box 5).30
Rural poverty has declined in many
African countries  Contrary to conventional
wisdom, the evidence indicates that rural
poverty has fallen in many African countries.
In Tanzania, for example, a comparison of
pre- and postreform household surveys sug-
gests that rural incomes rose and poverty
declined between the late 1970s and the
early 1990s.33 Similarly, a comparison of
two household surveys in Uganda estimates
that the incidence of poverty fell from 56
percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 1996.3419
Using an index that combines information on
the ownership of household assets and hous-
ing characteristics, another study findsthat
rural poverty declined in Ghana, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Box 5
Tobacco and Smallholder Agriculture in Malawi after Liberalization
T
he success of smallholder tobacco production in Malawi is in large part a consequence
of the recent liberalization efforts that allow smallholder participation in tobacco auction
floors, either through farmer clubs or though sales to licensed traders. So far the initial
response has been positive, with the number of smallholders growing tobacco more than
doubling between the 1993/94 and the 1994/95 growing seasons. Tobacco production has
increased smallholder farmers’ cash income.31 However, some studies report that liberal-
ization, in general, has benefited mainly households that produce a substantial marketed
surplus and those located in areas with good transportation and road infrastructure.32
THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURAL MARKET REFORM
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
T
he reform efforts of the 1980s and late
1990s have generated a positive
response in the agricultural sector of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Despite the progress that has
been made, however, the results of market
reform have generally not met expectations,
and much remains to be done.
The reforms focused on eliminating gov-
ernment control and increasing the producer
price of tradable agricultural commodities but
placed little emphasis on developing the insti-
tutions needed to support private sector activ-
ity. Improving price incentives and liberalizing
markets were expected to be enough to 
generate a supply response and create well-
functioning markets.The private sector was
expected to take over the institutional func-
tions the state had been providing.The reality
has been quite different.While private trade
has increased in virtually all agricultural mar-
kets, the private sector has been unable or
unwilling to supply credit and marketing ser-
vices in remote areas. And although the elimi-
nation of policies enforcing a uniform,
nationwide price has been a boon for many
producers and consumers close to markets, it
has often left farmers in remote areas worse
off than they were before liberalization.
Constraints to Further Reform
Sub-Saharan Africa faces a number of con-
straints in its efforts to reduce poverty
through agricultural market development.
These constraints include
• Structural factors: Investments in infra-
structure, communication, research and
extension, and marketing information
have been reduced as part of broader
budget-cutting efforts.
Zambia.35 In half of the countries, poverty
fell more than 9 percentage points. The evi-
dence was mixed in Senegal, and poverty
increased in Zimbabwe.20
• Institutional factors: Government regula-
tions regarding property rights, quality
control, contract enforcement, and good
governance continue to be weak.
• Implementation factors: The reform
process has suffered from incomplete
reforms, delays, and reversals owing to a
lack of government commitment and polit-
ical opposition by those with a vested
interest in the status quo.
• Exogenous factors: Drought, disease,
war, and civil strife have contributed to the
poor economic performance of Sub-
Saharan Africa.
These constraints mean that traders in
the region still face a great deal of risk.
Transaction costs are generally high and
unstable, and postreform marketing systems
do not operate efficiently yet, nor do they
provide market stability. Improving price
incentives for farmers, while necessary, has
not been enough to boost production.
Furthermore, in liberalized food- and cash-
crop markets, farmers have less access to
credit to purchase modern inputs. Finally,
Sub-Saharan African governments still inter-
vene in agricultural marketing activities in
many countries, sometimes because of
market failures.
What must be done to overcome the
remaining constraints and make agricultural
market reform more effective?
A New Agenda
Further progress in developing well-func-
tioning markets will require not only further
liberalization but also a more concerted
effort to go beyond the withdrawal of the
public sector from agricultural marketing.
The state must assume a new, supportive
role as market facilitator. One aspect of this
role is to strengthen investment in public
goods such as infrastructure, research and
extension, and public market information.
The second is to foster institutions required
for the development of competitive and effi-
cient markets. The new agenda for market
development in Sub-Saharan Africa
includes the following eight priorities:
1. Fully implement all reforms. Experience
shows that market performance improves
and marketing costs fall once the govern-
ment no longer monopolizes trade.
2. Find institutional solutions to provide
input credit to farmers. Credit for input
use can be provided through a number of
institutional innovations, including contract
farming, credit associations, group lending,
and farmers’ organizations.
3. Develop a legal infrastructure for mar-
ket transactions. This long-term step will
reduce the risk of investment and decrease
transaction costs for both farmers and
traders by clarifying property rights, enforc-
ing contracts, ensuring quality control, and
establishing rules of market conduct, among
other legal concerns.
4. Increase investment in infrastructure
and institutions. Higher productivity and
effective markets require investment in
research and extension, access to market
information, and efficient transportation and
communication networks.
5. Promote effective governance and
state capacity to monitor market devel-
opment. Proper governance will prevent
investment from being channeled to rent-
seeking groups and will ensure that funds
are distributed to their intended uses.
Improved state capacity to monitor market
development would allow governments to
anticipate undesirable market developments
and devise appropriate responses to even-
tual short-term difficulties in a timely and
effective manner.
6. Encourage smallholder production of
export crops. In many areas, food and
export crop production are highly complemen-
tary and export crop production has positive
spillover effects on input use and food crop21
productivity.Therefore, promoting smallholder
production of export crops should have bene-
ficial impacts on agricultural production in
general and on the food security and income
of smallholder farmers in particular.
7. Address the problems of vulnerable
groups in remote areas. Farmers in
remote rural areas have suffered from the
loss of parastatal activity and official pricing
that effectively subsidized high transporta-
tion costs. Short-term targeted interventions
may be needed to alleviate these problems.
8. Institute credible, sustainable macro-
economic policies. Indirect taxation
through overvalued exchange rates and pro-
tective industrial policies can have a more
negative effect on agricultural incentives
than direct taxation. In addition, stable and
predictable macroeconomic policies encour-
age savings and investment and focus pri-
vate sector effort on efficiency rather than
on anticipating and reacting to macro-
economic shocks.22
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